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Note
Legitimate Absenteeism: The Unconstitutionality
of the Caucus Attendance Requirement
Heather R. Abraham∗
As a wave of hope spread across the country during the
2008 election season, Felipe Goodman grew cynical.1 After serving ten years as a rabbi in Nevada, the Mexico native completed the citizenship process with the intention of voting in the
election.2 He registered to vote, only to learn that he had to
choose between two defining American promises—the freedom
of religion and the right to vote.3 State party officials had
scheduled Nevada’s caucuses on a Saturday.4 Party rules stipulated that he had to be physically present to vote in the party
caucus, no exceptions.5 Therefore, as an Orthodox rabbi, Goodman could not participate.6
Rabbi Goodman is not alone in his disenfranchisement. He
lives in one of fourteen states whose political parties still hold
caucuses to endorse presidential candidates.7 The physical at∗ J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Minnesota Law School. I thank
Professor David A. Schultz for his creative ideas and guidance in writing this
Note. I appreciate his dedication to academic collaboration with students.
Thanks to the many people who allowed me to interview them as I learned
more about party caucuses. I am struck by their tireless efforts to improve the
operation of the caucus system. In addition, a special thanks to Joe Hansen
and Laura Arneson of the Minnesota Law Review for their constructive comments and revisions and Managing Editor Charles Higgins for his attentive
edits and improvements. Copyright © 2011 by Heather R. Abraham.
1. See Hilary Leila Krieger, Caucus Deals Shabbat Blow to Vegas Rabbi,
JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 18, 2008, at 1.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.; see also Michael Falcone, Iowa Caucuses Move to Saturday in ’10,
POLITICO (July 29, 2009, 10:46 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0709/
25555.html (illustrating a possible trend toward Saturday caucuses).
5. See Krieger, supra note 1, at 1.
6. Id.
7. FEC, 2008 PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY DATES (2008), available at http://
www.fec.gov/pubrec/2008pdates.pdf. This number includes the District of Columbia, as well as states like Minnesota and Texas, which have two-step caucus-
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tendance requirement of most caucuses tends to disenfranchise
identifiable factions of voters, such as deployed service members, religious observers, persons with disabilities or in poor
health, students who attend school away from home, and shift
workers unable to leave work.8
Dubbed by the Washington Post as “undemocratic,”9 the
caucus system has been the focus of much-deserved criticism.
Historically, caucuses have drastically lower voter turnout
rates than primaries,10 attract voters from extreme ends of the
ideological spectrum,11 involve cumbersome procedural rules,12
and require long time commitments.13 Recent events have
plus-primary systems, and states like Washington and Idaho, in which at least
one party holds a nonbinding primary in addition to caucuses. See also 2008
Presidential Primary Calendar, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 9, 2008),
http://www.ncsl.org/LegislaturesElections/ElectionsCampaigns/Presidential
PrimariesCalendar2008/tabid/16512/Default.aspx. Some sources refer to the
New Mexico Democratic caucus as a primary because it is logistically similar
and allows for absentee voting. See Teddy Davis, Hillary Clinton Wins New
Mexico Primary, ABCNEWS.COM, Feb. 14, 2008, http://blogs.abcnews.com/
politicalradar/2008/02/hillary-clinton.html.
8. See, e.g., Scott Helman, Getting Out the College Vote—When Campuses
Are Empty: Primary Dates in N.H., Iowa Will Clash With Breaks, BOS. GLOBE,
Dec. 7, 2007, at A34, available at 2007 WLNR 24191117 (discussing the barriers students face in returning to campus to caucus and vote in primaries
during winter break); Jodi Kantor, Caucuses Give Iowa Influence, But Many
Iowans Are Left Out, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR
58001 (reporting that even the chairman of the Iowa Republican Party had to
miss his own caucus because he had to travel out of town on party business).
9. Sean Wilentz & Julian E. Zelizer, A Rotten Way to Pick a President,
WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2008, at B3.
10. See, e.g., Michael McDonald, 2008 Presidential Primary Turnout
Rates, U.S. ELECTION PROJECT (Oct. 8, 2008), http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_
2008P.html. For an example of the disparity, compare the historical numbers
of two states with similar populations from the same geographical region, such
as Minnesota and Wisconsin. In 2008, Wisconsin’s primary attracted 37.1 percent of eligible voters, while Minnesota’s caucuses drew only 7.4 percent. Id.
Considerably more voters participate in Wisconsin primaries, despite Minnesota’s traditionally high level of civic participation. See, e.g., Voter Turnout
Since 1950, MINN. SECRETARY ST., http://www.sos.state.mn.us/index.aspx?page=
667 (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).
11. See JAMES W. DAVIS, U.S. PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES AND THE CAUCUSCONVENTION SYSTEM 49–50 (1997) (employing Barry Goldwater’s success in
the 1964 caucuses to illustrate how an ideological minority of party voters can
sway caucus outcomes); William G. Mayer, Caucuses: How They Work, What
Difference They Make, in IN PURSUIT OF THE WHITE HOUSE 105, 130 (William
G. Mayer ed., 1996).
12. See Mayer, supra note 11, at 108–16.
13. See TOVA ANDREA WANG, THE CENTURY FOUND., HAS AMERICA
OUTGROWN THE CAUCUS? SOME THOUGHTS ON RESHAPING THE NOMINATION
CONTEST 3 (2007), available at http://tcf.org/media-center/2007/pr136.
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spawned a flood of additional scorn.14 For instance, in 2008, a
surge of new voters left caucus officials overwhelmed by the
masses, causing cramped voters to stand for hours in overcrowded elementary schools.15
Despite their flaws, caucuses are treasured by many voters
who have grown up with the tradition.16 Nonetheless, caucuses
in their current form may unconstitutionally deny some voters
their rights to vote. While some legal scholars have dismissed
party endorsements as private processes that are effectively offlimits to regulation,17 federal judicial precedent leaves the door
open for colorable constitutional arguments against the caucus
attendance requirement.
This Note contends that eligible party voters18 have the
constitutional right to vote in their parties’ caucuses without
being physically present.19 Part I details the history of the
American political caucus—its origin, changing form, and the
role political parties have played in shaping its structure. Part
14. See id.; Gilbert Cranberg et al., Op-Ed., Iowa’s Undemocratic Caucuses, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at A35, available at 2007 WLNR 24915832.
15. See George Diepenbrock & Sophia Maines, Overflow Crowds Jam
Caucus Sites, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD & NEWS, Feb. 6, 2008, http://www2.ljworld
.com/news/2008/feb/06/overflow_crowds_jam_caucus_sites/.
16. See Kantor, supra note 8, at A1 (explaining that many caucus-goers
value the community engagement opportunity caucuses provide). But see
Kathryn Pearson, Caucuses Are Voices of the Few, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis,
Minn.) (Feb. 10, 2008, 5:22 PM), http://www.startribune.com/opinion/
commentary/15453976.html (responding that in some caucuses, no dialogue between neighbors actually takes place).
17. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Whatever Happened to “One Person, One
Vote”?, SLATE (Feb. 5, 2008, 5:33 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2183751/ (arguing that parties have ultimate legal discretion over delegate selection).
18. One inherent difficulty in categorizing primary voters is that each
state has different eligibility rules. For instance, to caucus in Colorado, state
party members must be “affiliated” with the party for at least two months
prior to the caucus. See COLO. DEMOCRATIC PARTY, PLAN OF ORGANIZATION AND
RULES 25 (2009), available at http://www.coloradodems.org/docs/PartyRules_
20091205.pdf. By contrast, in states like Minnesota, eligibility is more flexible
as voters need not prove party loyalty even though they are statutorily supposed to “agree[ ]” with party principles. See MINN. STAT. § 202A.16 (2008)
(“Only those persons who are in agreement with the principles of the party as
stated in the party’s constitution, and who either voted or affiliated with the
party at the last general election or intend to vote or affiliate with the party at
the next state general election, may vote at the precinct caucus.”).
19. This Note focuses on presidential elections, but most of its arguments
extend to other federal and state elections. The Constitution protects the right
of all qualified citizens to vote in both state and federal elections. See, e.g.,
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299, 315 (1941).
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II examines three legal arguments that cast doubt on the constitutionality of the attendance requirement. First, caucuses
may violate the First Amendment associational rights of voters.
Second, they may breach Fourteenth Amendment equal protection of the right to vote. Third, they may constitute an unconstitutional poll tax. Part III proposes four alternatives to the
present system to mitigate potential unconstitutionality and
evaluates their likelihood of success against anticipated barriers to reform. Additionally, it examines which actors are best
situated to reform caucuses. This Note concludes that the two
most effective avenues to reform the caucus system to reduce
the risk of unconstitutionality are an associational rights judicial challenge and congressional legislation. In light of the recent establishment of reform commissions within the two major
national parties to address delegate selection and an upcoming
presidential election with a wide-open Republican field, a failure to reform caucuses could have substantial adverse implications.
I. THE ORIGINS AND CHANGING FORM OF POLITICAL
CAUCUSES
The process of selecting presidential nominees has evolved
considerably in the past two centuries from a system in which
congressmen chose their parties’ nominees to today’s state-bystate primary and caucus scheme.20 Primaries and caucuses in
their modern forms are reactions to the party-controlled “Boss
Tweed” and “King Caucus” era of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.21 In the 1910s and shortly thereafter, the
voting public came to regard the caucus system as an instrument of party leader control; this perception stimulated a shift
in many states from caucuses to primaries.22 Today, most
states either hold state-operated primaries or outsource the
process to political parties in the form of caucuses.23 This Part

20.
21.
22.
23.

See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 9–18.
Id. at 11–12.
Id.
See, e.g., Robert McDowell, It’s Time to Return to the Caucus System,
TULSA BEACON, Apr. 30, 2009, http://www.tulsabeacon.com/?p=1940. Despite
the overall trend toward primaries, in recent years some states have considered returning to caucuses to save desperately needed revenue. See id. (advocating a shift from primaries to caucuses to conserve tax dollars). Some states
have gone so far as to debate eliminating the primary system altogether. Cf.
Presidential Primaries, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 12, 2005), http://
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examines the origin and changing nature of the party caucus
within the American political landscape.
A. POLITICAL CAUCUSES AND PRIMARIES DEFINED
The term “caucus” has several meanings in American nomenclature. Early accounts refer to it as an informal nickname
for party meetings for selecting candidates for political office.24
Today, in addition to referring to meetings for selecting candidates, it also refers to an organized group of people who share
common interests, such as a caucus within a legislature.25 The
caucus attendance requirement, as used in this Note, refers to
any state party rule requiring physical attendance in order to
vote for a presidential nominee in a precinct caucus.
In contrast, a “primary election” is a preliminary election,
not requiring physical attendance, in which voters nominate a
candidate for the general election.26 The most significant difference between caucuses and primaries is administration. Parties
usually operate and pay for caucuses while state governments
fund and administer primaries.27 An “open” primary allows
voters to choose the party from which they wish to endorse a
candidate, no matter their political affiliation.28 Most states
have “closed” primaries, which require voters to indicate a party preference and limit their choice of candidates to one party.29
A “blanket” primary requires no party affiliation and does not
restrict a voter’s choice of candidates to a single party.30

www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16568 (listing state bills introduced to eliminate presidential primaries).
24. JOHN PICKERING, A VOCABULARY 55 (1816). The word “cant” illustrates the slang-like, informal nature of caucuses. Id.
25. JACK C. PLANO & MILTON GREENBERG, AMERICAN POLITICAL
DICTIONARY 95, 130 (rev. ed. 1967).
26. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 557 (8th ed. 2004). This Note also employs
“primary” as a general term for the primary season, which encompasses both
primaries and caucuses.
27. See, e.g., McDowell, supra note 23.
28. NEW DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN POLITICS 302–03 (Edward Conrad
Smith & Arnold John Zurcher eds., 1949); DAVID ROBERTSON, A DICTIONARY
OF MODERN POLITICS 274 –75 (1985).
29. NEW DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 28, at 302–03.
30. THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF POLITICS, at x (Iain McLean &
Alistair McMillan eds., 2009) (“[V]oters are free to move back and forth across
a blanket-sized ballot that includes all candidates from all parties.”).
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B. COURT- AND PARTY-INITIATED CAUCUS REFORM
Political theorists and party leaders have argued that nominations are more important than general elections because
“the quality of the people’s verdict [in the general election] depends on the quality of the options from which they cho[o]se.”31
It is no surprise, then, that traditionally excluded caucus and
primary voters have challenged party attempts to prevent their
participation. This section highlights legal and political developments that frame the constitutional issues surrounding primary elections, in general, and the caucus attendance requirement, in particular.
In a series of cases spanning the 1920s–1930s, courts
pierced the private structure of political parties by invalidating
white-only primaries. In 1927, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously overturned a Texas white-only primary statute as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause.32 The Texas Democratic Party’s State Executive Committee then passed a new resolution limiting eligibility in its
primary to white voters.33 Finding that the Executive Committee was acting not as a mere private organization but “in matters of high public interest, matters intimately connected with
the capacity of government to exercise its functions,” the Court
held 5-4 that the Committee’s actions violated the Equal Protection Clause.34 Twelve years later in Smith v. Allwright, the
Court crafted a stronger rule that white-only primaries also violated the Fifteenth Amendment.35 These cases36 provide a basis for judicial intervention into party activities when a party

31. Alexandra L. Cooper, Nominating Presidential Candidates: The Primary Season Compared to Two Alternatives, 54 POL. RES. Q. 771, 774 (2001)
(quoting WILLIAM R. KEECH & DONALD R. MATTHEWS, THE PARTY’S CHOICE 1
(1976)); see also DAVIS, supra note 11, at 1 (quoting infamous party boss William Marcy Tweed as saying, “I don’t care who does the electing just so I can
do the nominating.”).
32. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540–41 (1927).
33. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 82 (1932).
34. Id. at 88–89.
35. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944) (“When primaries become
a part of the machinery for choosing officials, state and national[,] . . . the
same tests to determine the character of discrimination or abridgement should
be applied to the primary as are applied to the general election.”).
36. Collectively, this universe of cases is commonly referred to as the
“white primary cases.” See, e.g., Michael J. Pitts, Redistricting and Discriminatory Purpose, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1575, 1616 (2010).
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violates the Constitution while performing a state-like function,
such as administering elections.37
In 1968, the nation watched in shock as violence erupted at
the Democratic National Convention in Chicago.38 In response
to the “bitter disharmony”39 of 1968, the Democratic Party initiated what became known as the McGovern-Fraser Commission.40 The Commission established guidelines for the delegateselection process that weakened the degree of party leader control.41 The National Republican Party largely mirrored the
Democratic reforms suggested by the Commission.42 In response to public calls for reform, many state legislatures also
replaced their caucuses with primaries even though the national parties had not mandated it.43
While party attempts to reform delegate selection have not
subsided, recent changes have been more incremental.44 One
noteworthy change is party efforts to expand the caucus-going
population. For instance, in 2004 and 2008, the Maine State
Democratic Party responded to historically low caucus turnout
by operating a robust absentee voting program.45 Further, or37. Allwright, 321 U.S. at 664.
38. Cooper, supra note 31, at 772.
39. Judith A. Center, 1972 Democratic Convention Reforms and Party
Democracy, 89 POL. SCI. Q. 325, 326 (1974).
40. Cooper, supra note 31, at 772.
41. THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS IN A REFORM AGE
36 (1981). The guidelines focused on three recurring themes: more rank-andfile party members should be encouraged to participate; the convention should
be more representative of historically underrepresented groups like racial minorities, women, and young voters; and the allocation of delegates should better reflect the wishes of ordinary party voters, not just party regulars. Id.
42. See id. at 40.
43. Id. at 47. In 1968, sixteen Republican state parties and seventeen
Democratic state parties held primaries. Id. By 1980, thirty-six Republican
and thirty-four Democratic state parties had shifted to primaries. Id.
44. See THOMAS GANGALE, FROM THE PRIMARIES TO THE POLLS: HOW TO
REPAIR AMERICA’S BROKEN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION PROCESS 21 (2008)
(finding that after McGovern-Fraser, parties “tinker[ed] around the edges”
with efforts like the Mikulski and Winograd Commissions).
45. See Arden Manning, Letter to the Editor, Democrats’ Caucus Will Play
Large Role in Election, MORNING SENTINEL (Maine), Feb. 9, 2008, http://
morningsentinel.mainetoday.com/view/letters/4737404.html; Telephone Interview with Arden Manning, State Exec. Dir., Me. Democratic Party (Nov. 12,
2009) [hereinafter Manning Interview]. In Douglas County, Nebraska, the local
Democratic Party created its own absentee process to expand caucus voting to
deployed troops, people in nursing homes, the homebound, the disabled, students, and employees who could not miss work. See Telephone Interview with
Carol Casey, Exec. Dir., Douglas Cnty. Democrats (Oct. 19, 2009).
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ganizers within both major national parties have compelled
their national committees to establish commissions to study
caucus-related voting reform.46 Despite these efforts, most caucus state parties maintain stringent physical attendance requirements.47
C. LEGAL PRECEDENT FOR CHALLENGING THE ATTENDANCE
REQUIREMENT
Federal election law offers several methods for challenging
the caucus system. This section provides the background for
three colorable constitutional challenges: associational rights,
equal protection, and poll taxes.
1. The Right to Political Association
It is settled law that individuals have the right to politically associate under the First48 and Fourteenth49 Amendments,
which, among other things, allows them “to band together in
promoting . . . the electorate candidates who espouse their political views.”50 Regulations that “severe[ly] burden” associational rights must be tailored to serve a compelling state interest.51
46. See Telephone Interview with Roman Buhler, Former Staff Member,
Republican Nat’l Convention (RNC) (Oct. 28, 2009) [hereinafter Buhler Interview]. In anticipation of the RNC, organizers from John McCain’s campaign
for president drafted a resolution requiring the party to provide an absentee
voting option in caucuses for military personnel. Id. Two military veterans introduced this strongly worded proposed rule to the RNC Rules Committee, but
the final version passed by the RNC was amended to encourage state parties
to use “every means practicable” to encourage military participation in the
delegate selection process. Id.; see also REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., THE RULES
OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, Rule 15(c)(7), at 20 (2008), available at http://www
.gop.com/images/legal/2008_Rules_Adopted.pdf. Similarly, the Democratic National Committee instituted a commission to study the nominations process
and improve the caucus system by 2012. Jeff Zeleny, It’s Never Too Soon to
Think About 2012, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2009, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes
.com/2009/03/23/its-never-to-soon-to-think-about-2012/. The final report vaguely
recommends the Party’s Rules Committee undertake more detailed oversight of
state caucus systems. See DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., REPORT OF THE DEMOCRATIC CHANGE COMMISSION 20 (2009), available at http://www.thegreenpapers
.com/P12/Democratic_Change_Commisison_Report-2009-12-30.pdf.
47. See, e.g., WANG, supra note 13, at 3.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
49. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
50. Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586 (2005) (quoting Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000)).
51. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997); see
also Lauren Hancock, Note, The Life of the Party: Analyzing Political Parties’
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Political parties also have a right to political association,
which includes the right to determine their criteria for selecting
delegates to their national conventions.52 However, this right is
not limitless, even though the Supreme Court has not precisely
defined the boundaries.53 In fact, in Cousins v. Wigoda, the
Court was careful to leave the door open for future judicial intervention into party nominations.54 In addition to individual
and party rights, state governments also have legitimate interests in fair election administration.55 In the context of party
nominations, these rights often conflict.
The individual right to associate does not extend to participation in elections operated by private entities.56 In order for a
disenfranchised voter to claim constitutional violation of her
right to vote, a court must find that the state has acted in violation of a right.57 Traditionally, courts have viewed political parties as private actors.58 However, the Supreme Court has
pierced the shield of private organizations in instances when a
party effectively acts as a state.59 For instance, in Allwright,
the Court held that a party acted as the state in administering
matters intimately connected with state authority.60 In Terry v.
Adams, a local Democratic party required candidates to secure
the nominations of a private club instead of the party itself.61
The party’s ostensible purpose was to protect itself from the
reach of the Fifteenth Amendment.62 However, the Court rejected a formalistic public-private distinction and held that the
First Amendment Associational Rights when the Primary Election Process Is
Construed Along a Continuum, 88 MINN. L. REV. 159, 169–71 (2003).
52. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975) (holding that an Illinois
state law on delegate qualifications did not prevail over conflicting national
party rules).
53. Bachur v. Democratic Nat’l Party, 836 F.2d 837, 841 (4th Cir. 1987).
54. Id. (stating that Cousins did not decide the extent to which the Court
advised judicial intervention into party matters).
55. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (“[A]s a practical matter,
there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and
honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.”).
56. See, e.g., Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 86–89 (1932).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (outlining the causes of a civil action for deprivation of rights).
58. E.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 656, 659–61 (1944); Nixon, 286
U.S. at 86–89.
59. See Allwright, 321 U.S. at 663–64.
60. Id.
61. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 461 (1953).
62. Id. at 462–64.
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Jaybird Association had taken state action within the scope of
the Constitution.63 In essence, the Court found that the party’s
action amounted to an attempt to hide a public action behind a
private subterfuge.64
Later cases have tended to favor party associational rights
over state interests. In 1980, Wisconsin adopted open primaries
in violation of the National Democratic Party’s rules.65 Democratic Party of the United States v. La Follette pitted state interests in election administration against the right of the national party to define the boundaries of its political
association.66 The Court held that a state could not constitutionally compel a national party to seat delegates chosen in violation of the national party’s rules.67 While this was a decisive
victory for political parties, the Court left several questions unanswered. For instance, was the ruling limited to open primaries? When should courts apply the white-primary cases—and
thereby pierce the party structure—and when should they look
to La Follette?
In 2000, the Court moved further away from the earlier
public-private distinction and toward stronger party rights.68
California Democratic Party v. Jones involved a state attempt
to institute a blanket primary over the objections of a state political party.69 It presented the question of whether a state legislature had the constitutional authority to define the party’s
political association so broadly.70 In conducting its analysis, the
Court employed a “flexible” Burdick balancing test, which first
measures the degree of injury to the plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and then weighs it against interests
claimed by the state to justify its actions.71 Even if the imposition on a party is “severely” burdensome, a state regulation
may still survive the scrutiny if it is “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.”72 Weighing
the interests of the state in fair election administration against
63. Id. at 470.
64. See id.
65. Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wis. ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107,
109 (1980).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 126.
68. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 569.
71. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
72. Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
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the right of the party to define its association, the Supreme
Court held 7-2 that the party’s right outweighed the compelling
interests of the state.73
Two recent cases appear to back away from La Follette and
Jones. First, the Court in Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party upheld a ballot initiative approved
by voters that allows candidates to self-designate their party
preference.74 The Party lost, despite its objection that voters
would misinterpret the self-designated party label as a party
nomination.75 In Clingman v. Beaver, the Court also employed
a less absolutist party-or-state approach.76 It upheld a statecreated semi-closed primary in which registered members of a
third party could not vote in the primary of a majority party
(and vice versa).77 The Court underscored that states must
have the authority to enact reasonable regulations of parties,
elections, and ballots to reduce the risk of disorder.78 The outcomes of these cases raise questions as to the future of associational rights jurisprudence.
2. Equal Protection of Votes: One Person, One Vote
The right to vote is fundamental to our political system.79
Although the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly prescribe a
right to vote, the Court has declared that voting is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution.80 The right to vote extends beyond the physical act of voting to the election procedures that affect the proportional weight of one’s vote.81 The
73. See Jones, 530 U.S. at 568, 586 (indicating that the California law severely and unnecessarily burdened the Democratic Party’s right to political
association).
74. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442,
444 (2008).
75. Id. at 448 (describing the Republican Party’s contention that the new
system forced it to associate with candidates it did not endorse).
76. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 589–90 (2005).
77. Id. at 584 –85.
78. Id. at 593.
79. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF
LAWS 13 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., 1989) (1748) (“Just as the division of those having the right to vote is a fundamental law in the republic, the
way of casting the vote is another fundamental law.”).
80. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (citing
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314 –15 (1941)).
81. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (“The right to vote is protected
in more than the initial allocation of the franchise.”). Although the Court
stated that Bush was limited to its circumstances, multiple courts have since
affirmed that voting extends beyond the initial franchise. See, e.g., League of
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Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment82 also
protects the right of voters to participate in elections on an
equal basis with one another.83 A state may not value one person’s vote over another’s by arbitrary and disparate treatment.84 Effectively, this body of law commands the equal
weight of votes in both theory and practice.
The 2008 election fueled public discourse over the arbitrary
weight assigned by parties to caucus votes.85 In Nevada, voters
challenged an at-large caucus district because votes cast there
had greater mathematical weight than at other caucuses.86 In
Texas, voters litigated whether the Democratic Party can
knowingly allot disproportionate values to caucus votes.87 In totality, the caucus system raises grave concerns about the arbi-

Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 477 (6th Cir. 2008) (applying
Bush); In re Contest of Gen. Election Held on Nov. 4, 2008, for the Purpose of
Electing a U.S. Senator from Minn., 767 N.W.2d 453, 465–66 (Minn. 2009)
(same).
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
83. See supra notes 74 –75. The Court has stated that “all who participate
in the election are to have an equal vote—whatever their race, whatever their
sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income, and wherever their
home may be in that geographical unit.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557–
58 (1964) (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379–80 (1963)).
84. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 –05.
85. See, e.g., Shailagh Murray, After Nevada Caucuses, Charges of Foul
Play, WASH. POST BLOG (Jan. 20, 2008, 6:56 PM), http://blog.washingtonpost
.com/44/2008/01/20/after_nevada_caucuses_charges.html. In the public comments to the article, caucus-goers from across the state described their negative experiences, like waiting in lines for hours. Id. One voter was shocked to
learn, after being elected a delegate, that she would have to pay thirty-five dollars to attend the next caucus. Id.
86. David McGrath Schwartz, Ruling on Strip Voting Looks Likely Today,
LAS VEGAS SUN, Jan. 17, 2008, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2008/jan/17/
Strip_voting/. Ultimately, a federal district court held in favor of the Nevada
Democratic Party in a bench decision, finding that parties may set up their
own caucus guidelines if they do not discriminate against voters based on race,
gender, or religion. See June Kronholz, Judge Upholds Nevada’s Casino Caucuses, WALL ST. J. WASH. WIRE (Jan. 1, 2008, 5:12 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
washwire/2008/01/17/judge-upholds-nevadas-casino-caucuses/; Adrienne Packer, Judge OKs At-Large Caucuses on Strip, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Jan. 18, 2008,
http://www.lvrj.com/news/13891177.html.
87. See LULAC of Tex. v. Tex. Democratic Party, 651 F. Supp. 2d 700,
700–02 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (finding that the portion of the Voting Rights Act requiring a political party to preclear delegate allocation formulas did not impermissibly infringe on the party’s associational rights, but not deciding
whether the Texas Democratic Party’s delegate allocation plan discriminated
against minority voters on account of race or color).
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trary and disproportionate weight assigned to factors like
wealth, health, and geography.88
3. Twenty-Fourth Amendment Poll Tax
The Twenty-Fourth Amendment states that the right of
citizens to vote “shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or any state by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or
other tax.”89 The Court overturned a poll tax in Harman v.
Forssenius on the basis of the amendment, but has otherwise
largely avoided its application.90 In a later decision, Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections, the Court invalidated a poll tax,
but on Fourteenth Amendment equal protection grounds.91 Categorized by some as “the most insignificant” amendment,92 the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment’s sparse history suggests that
courts are hesitant to consider in their voting-rights jurisprudence the disproportionate effects of voting-related costs on less
affluent voters. However, with the recent movement by state
legislatures to require voters to present government-issued
identification at the polls, courts are encountering a resurgent
body of poll tax-related litigation.93 Indeed, with increasing
state budget constraints and the possibility that state and local
governments might attempt to pass election administration
costs onto voters, some legal scholars suggest that litigators
should define the contours of the amendment before “it makes a
difference in a charged political context.”94
Looking to the history of the amendment, courts have
treated its passage as an attempt to sever the link between
wealth and voting eligibility.95 Harman, for example, presented
88. Cf. id.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
90. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 544 (1965); see also Allison
R. Hayward, What Is an Unconstitutional “Other Tax” on Voting? Construing
the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 8 ELECTION L.J. 103, 104, 117–22 (2009).
91. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
92. T.R.B. from Washington, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 9, 1963, at 2.
93. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198–99
(2008).
94. Hayward, supra note 90, at 122.
95. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 668; David Schultz & Sarah Clark, Wealth v.
Democracy: The Unfulfilled Promise of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment 4 –5
(2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/david_
schultz/14/ (arguing that the Supreme Court and Congress understood the
amendment to be a broad rejection of the link between wealth and voting). For
a more comprehensive history of property tests in voting, see KIRK H. PORTER,
A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 77–111 (1969).
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the issue of whether Virginia could constitutionally require a
voter to either pay a poll tax or file a certificate of residency.96
The majority said that the legislative history of the amendment
illustrated Congress’s “repugnance to the disenfranchisement
of the poor occasioned by failure to pay [a poll] tax.”97 The
Court emphasized that even negligible taxes that impose only a
slight economical obstacle violate the amendment.98 The majority also noted that voter turnout in poll tax states was low compared to the eligible voting population.99 Since the amendment
states that the right to vote shall not be “denied or abridged,”100
the Harman Court stated that the amendment’s language “nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes” of voting
impairment.101 In Harper, the Court similarly concluded that to
introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measurement of voting qualifications would be to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor.102
Recent voter identification cases have challenged courts to
incorporate the financial burdens on voters as a factor in deciding voting-rights litigation. In Crawford v. Marion County, the
Court held that the compelling state interests in requiring photo identification sufficiently justified the burden it imposed on
voters.103 Although the petitioner did not make a TwentyFourth Amendment claim, the majority acknowledged that admissible evidence demonstrating the burden the law placed on
voters might comprise a constitutional objection.104 In Common
Cause/Georgia v. Billups, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a similar voter identification law after weighing the state’s interest in
electoral integrity against the burden on voters of procuring
96. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 538 (1965).
97. Id. at 539.
98. Id.
99. Id. That the Court identified a correlation between voting taxes and
low voter turnout is particularly applicable to the caucus context because caucuses have drastically lower turnout than primaries. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 10.
100. U.S. CONST. amend XXIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
101. Harman, 380 U.S. at 540–41 (quoting Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268,
275 (1939)).
102. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (“‘A citizen, a
qualified voter, is no more or no less so because he lived in the city or on the
farm.’ . . . We say the same whether the citizen, otherwise qualified to vote,
has $1.50 in his pocket or nothing at all . . . .” (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 568 (1964))).
103. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198–99 (2008).
104. Id. at 202–03.
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voter identification.105 However, the circuit court highlighted a
key fact that the identification was available to voters for free,
which may not be true of all voter identification schemes.106 It
is also noteworthy that while the court required the state to
identify a compelling interest, it did not require the state to
prove that voter identification was necessary to prevent voter
fraud.107 In other cases, however, courts have overturned voter
identification requirements. For instance, in Winschenk v. Missouri, the Missouri Supreme Court distinguished the controversy from the voter identification schemes in Indiana and
Georgia by highlighting that the plaintiffs provided empirical
evidence illustrating the burden on voters to acquire the proper
identification.108 Such costs convinced the court that the plaintiffs had satisfied both strict scrutiny and the lesser burden of
the Burdick test.109
Drawing from this jurisprudence, potential plaintiffs have
colorable constitutional challenges to the caucus system under
the First, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments.
II. LITIGATING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
ATTENDANCE REQUIREMENT
Although some scholars maintain that state regulation of
caucuses constitutes impermissible government intervention,110
federal case law suggests that there is room for alternative interpretations of the constitutional relationship between parties,
voters, and the state. This Part analyzes three central arguments for challenging the caucus attendance rule: first, that
the associational rights of voters outweigh those of party associational rights; second, that caucuses may violate the equal protection doctrine by allocating unequal weight to votes; and,
third, that the financial burdens of caucuses may constitute a
poll tax. Under this analysis, the caucus attendance requirement may be unconstitutional under First Amendment association rights doctrine and Fourteenth Amendment equal protec105. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1353–55 (11th Cir. 2009).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1353.
108. See Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 214 (Mo. 2006).
109. Id. at 216 (deciding ultimately to apply strict scrutiny). While the
court acknowledged that the Missouri state constitution appeared to offer
more voter protection than the U.S. Constitution, it was not clear that it was
dispositive. Id.
110. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 17.
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tion, and questionable under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition of poll and other voting taxes.
A. THE ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUAL VOTERS
OUTWEIGH PARTY RIGHTS
In the white-primary cases, the Court rejected a formalistic
public-private distinction to hold that private action sometimes
constitutes state action. The logic of the white-primary cases is
applicable to present-day caucuses. This section posits that political parties, in administering caucuses, take state action.
Further, it argues that if courts were to conceptualize party associational rights as a collection of individual associational
rights, there is a strong argument that courts should prioritize
individual rights over those of the party.
In Terry v. Adams, the Court emphasized the overall effect
of the private action rather than restricting the concept of state
action to a formal distinction between public and private entities.111 Terry found that the state, in permitting party-operated
primaries, had effectively sanctioned the unconstitutional activity.112 Thus, if a state permits a party to operate an unconstitutional caucus, it may also sanction an unconstitutional activity.
By contrast, in its ruling in Jones, the Supreme Court held
that the party’s associational rights outweighed the compelling
interests of the state.113 Although this most recent articulation
affirms the associational rights of parties when pitted against
less-than-compelling state interests, it does not directly compare the associational rights of a party to those of individual
party voters, as do the white-primary cases.114 Therefore, Jones
does not stand for the proposition that party associational
rights will always trump individual associational rights.
Although parties have substantial freedom to determine
the rules by which they select presidential electors,115 neither
Jones nor La Follette—which pitted a state’s interest in election
111. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469–70 (1953) (“It is immaterial that
the state does not control that part of this elective process which it leaves for
the Jaybirds to manage. . . . The effect of the whole procedure . . . is to do precisely that which the Fifteenth Amendment forbids . . . .”).
112. See id.; supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text (describing Smith v.
Allwright and the Court’s disapproval of white-only primaries).
113. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 582, 585–86 (2000).
114. See id.
115. See id.; Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wis. ex rel. La Follette, 450
U.S. 107, 122 (1980).
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administration against a national party’s right to define its political association—measured the associational rights of party
voters against the party. Conceptualizing a party as an entity
comprised of its members, the party unit becomes nothing more
than a collection of individual associational rights. By defending the party unit at the expense of the individual voters, a
court would undermine the more vital associational rights of
voters in favor of a nonhuman entity. It is also noteworthy that
the regulations invalidated in Jones and La Follette were exceptional examples of state intervention.116 In both cases, a
state attempted to define a party’s political association for the
party by opening its primaries to voters not ideologically
aligned with the party.117 Caucus reform policies under which
parties retain substantial autonomy to define their association
likely would not trigger nor violate Jones or La Follette
precedent, making it more likely that a court would uphold a
party member’s associational rights challenge.
In a case between a party and potential caucus-goers, a
court would likely begin by employing the “flexible” two-part
Burdick balancing test.118 First, a court would assess the magnitude of the asserted injury to the plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.119 Then, a court would weigh
whether the precise state or party interests outweigh the injury.120 Thus, in order for a potential litigant to establish a
claim, she would need to prove that a party’s physical attendance requirement abridged her right to associate121—a relatively straightforward argument for someone who was literally
unable to attend due to military deployment, and a more difficult but still feasible contention for someone who could not
leave work during caucus hours. The litigant would also need to
convince a court that her individual rights are more compelling
than the party’s interest.122
For instance, assume that litigants challenged a state party’s physical attendance requirement. A party might defend its
associational rights by asserting that it has a right to define the
116. See Jones, 530 U.S. at 570; La Follette, 450 U.S. at 110–12.
117. See Jones, 530 U.S. at 570; La Follette, 450 U.S. at 110–12.
118. La Follette, 450 U.S. at 110–12.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992); La Follette, 450 U.S.
at 110–12.
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contours of its political association. However, a party cannot establish that a court ruling against a physical attendance requirement would be paramount to a Jones infringement on its
associational rights.123 Depending on the remedy—such as
whether the court issued an injunction or required a party to
provide an alternative or absentee process—a party probably
cannot successfully argue that elimination of the physical attendance requirement would open its caucus doors to people
with whom a party would not otherwise associate. Those voters
would already be eligible to caucus with the party. In fact, the
voters who would take advantage of an alternative process like
an absentee ballot are people who would participate but for the
prohibitive attendance requirement. In contrast to a party, a
potential caucus voter has an equal, if not more compelling, associational right to participate in the caucus process.124
Alternatively, suppose that a state legislature enacted a
mandatory absentee process for state party caucuses. In a court
case challenging the absentee process, a party would probably
assert the same arguments as discussed in the previous hypothetical, claiming that it infringes on its associational rights.
However, the state could argue that it had several compelling
reasons for regulating the caucus process: increasing access for
persons with disabilities,125 increasing voter participation,126
improving election administration, and enhancing voter confidence in a highly criticized system.127 It could also argue that it
reformed the law specifically because the attendance requirement violates the associational rights of caucus-goers. One advantage to this approach is that precedent exists establishing a
state’s compelling interest in fair, accessible elections. Even if a
court found the state’s requirements “severely” burdensome on
the party, the state regulation could still survive judicial scrutiny if it was “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of

123. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (finding that
the law forced parties to associate with those who did not share their beliefs).
124. See, e.g., Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 82 (1932) (finding that a state
cannot deny participation in a primary based on race); Nixon v. Herndon, 273
U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (addressing a similar law in which primary voting was
determined by race).
125. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
126. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 609 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“States do have a valid interest in conducting orderly elections and in encouraging the maximum participation . . . .”).
127. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439–40.
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compelling importance.”128 Given this framework, states, too,
may have a strong claim to regulate some aspects of party activity, particularly given that states have a lower burden of
proof than parties in this context.129
Two recent cases give additional weight to the argument
that litigants might prevail on an associational rights challenge
to the caucus attendance requirement. First, in Washington
State Grange, which upheld a referendum allowing candidates
to self-select their party affiliation, the Supreme Court took a
more flexible, less formalistic approach to state party interests
than in Jones.130 The Court underscored a state’s power to prescribe the time, place, and manner of elections for federal and
state offices.131 The opinion also reiterated that the Court has
repeatedly upheld reasonable, politically neutral regulations
that have the effect of channeling expressive activity at the
polls.132 Finally, the Court rejected the state party’s attempt to
extend the Jones decision by arguing that the primary system
opened the party to outsiders.133 The majority opinion suggests
that Jones is not a broad rule guiding all associational rights
litigation, but one limited to severe, demonstrable infringements.
In a second recent case, Clingman v. Beaver, the Court also
recognized the right of states to intervene in certain party operations.134 Upholding a restriction that members of a third
party could not vote in the majority party’s primary, the Court
underscored that states must be able to enact reasonable regulations of parties, elections, and ballots to reduce the risk of
election disorder.135 Although Clingman affirms a party’s right
to define its political association, it appears to back away from
Jones and indicates that the Court is willing to engage in a
closer, fact-specific analysis.
128. Id. at 434 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
129. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 208–09 (1992) (applying a
modified burden, which does not require empirical proof by the state of election fraud for cases in which a First Amendment right threatens to interfere
with the act of voting, such as voter confusion or when the activity physically
interferes with a voter’s ability to cast a ballot). Such a modified burden would
likely apply to caucuses. See id.
130. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442,
444, 442–59 (2008).
131. Id. at 451.
132. Id. at 452.
133. Id. at 452–53.
134. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 589–90 (2005).
135. Id. at 593–94, 598.
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Currently, political parties have substantial latitude to define their political association,136 and the lack of direct government regulation of caucuses allows parties free reign to dictate
the parameters of caucus participants’ associational rights. Political parties, through caucuses, can narrow a field of candidates in a race from a dozen to one, making pre-general elections crucial fora for meaningful political association.137 Thus,
in organizing caucuses, political parties have considerable power and administer matters intimately connected with state authority.
The Court’s associational rights jurisprudence leaves the
door open for successful litigation that the caucus attendance
requirement is a violation of the First Amendment associational rights of voters. Although litigants pursuing this line of argumentation will likely face a state-action challenge, the Court
has pierced private entities when their primaries are a part of
the essential election machinery of a state and could do so in
the case of caucuses.
B. CAUCUSES MAY VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE
THROUGH VOTE DILUTION
The caucus attendance requirement also presents a possible equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Since an inflexible all-or-nothing attendance requirement divides voters into classes based on arbitrary factors, it may unconstitutionally and disproportionately dilute votes.138 There
are, however, two significant hurdles to making this argument
in court: first, providing a factual basis to illustrate electoral
irregularity; and, second, establishing discrimination.139 Nonetheless, with appropriate documentation, litigants could make

136. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 –76 (2000); Richard L. Hasen, Too Plain for Argument? The Uncertain Congressional Power
to Require Parties to Choose Presidential Nominees Through Direct and Equal
Primaries, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 2009, 2014 –16 (2008).
137. A number of cases suggest that primary elections are more important
for political association than general elections. See, e.g., Clingman, 544 U.S. at
599–600 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (finding that primaries dictate the range of
choices available by voters in the general election); Cal. Democratic Party, 530
U.S. at 575 (noting that primaries are a “crucial juncture” in the electoral
process).
138. See LULAC of Tex. v. Tex. Democratic Party, 651 F. Supp. 2d 700,
701–03 (W.D. Tex. 2009); Schwartz, supra note 86.
139. See League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 476–78
(6th Cir. 2008).
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a strong argument that caucuses unequally and arbitrarily disqualify voters.
Caucuses are relatively informal gatherings that have an
immense impact on elections. Caucuses vary by county, state
legislative district, and precinct.140 Since there are few controlling state laws, uneven training among caucus volunteers, and
limited institutional knowledge in some localities, there is extreme irregularity in the treatment of votes.141 Arbitrary discrimination, even without intentionally targeting a suspect
class, may violate the Equal Protection Clause by unconstitutionally violating the one person, one vote doctrine.142 One simple illustration of arbitrary discrimination is that caucuses allow biased voters to count the ballots rather than neutral
administrators.143 This method can affect the weight of votes
from one precinct to the next. Another potential source of discrimination is the intimidation factor: caucuses discourage participation by people who are hesitant to publicly announce and
defend their votes.144 Most concerning of all, however, the attendance requirement forces people to attend caucuses at the
expense of other significant life responsibilities145 or constitutionally protected rights, such as the free practice of religion.146
It also requires people who are disabled or homebound to either
make precarious trips to their caucus sites, possibly standing
uncomfortably for hours, or surrender their franchise altogether.147
140. See Mayer, supra note 11, at 108.
141. See Tom McCarthy, Nebraska Caucus: Omayhem, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 9, 2008, 4:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-mccarthy/nebraska
-caucus-omayhem_b_85841.html (describing the problems surrounding a Nebraska caucus).
142. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557–58 (1964); Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 898–99 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
143. See Pearson, supra note 16 (“Every ballot counter . . . wore a T-shirt or
button in support of the same candidate. So much for neutrality in election
administration.”).
144. See, e.g., Ralph Thomas, Caucus? Primary? Voters Here Can Do Both,
SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 28, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR 1657266 (paraphrasing a former Washington Secretary of State who contends that caucuses
require people to argue with their neighbors about politics); Wilentz & Zelizer,
supra note 9, at B3.
145. See, e.g., Kantor, supra note 8, at A1.
146. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 1, at 1.
147. See WANG, supra note 13, at 5; Gail Collins, Op-ed., Notes From a
Caucus, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2008, at A35, available at 2008 WLNR 2833178
(attesting that a woman on chemotherapy had to leave the caucus for health
reasons after several hours of waiting and never voting).
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Recent litigation after Bush v. Gore presents a promising
model for an equal protection challenge of caucuses. In League
of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, plaintiffs successfully
overcame a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim by illustrating compelling examples of gross disparities between
polling locations in a primary based on geographic differences.148 The court held that such allegations were sufficient to
state an equal protection claim. The equal protection claim focused on discrepancies in the following procedures: registration, absentee ballots, polling places by location (including the
amount of time travelling to polling places and polling places
that did not open on time), lack of training among poll workers,
and unfair treatment of disabled voters.149
Plaintiffs may be required to prove not just discrimination
but intentional discrimination to win equal protection claims.150
The court in Brunner did not decide the issue because it was
not the precise matter before the court. However, in Washington v. Davis, the Court held that intentional discrimination is
not the only form of discrimination prohibited by the Constitution.151 Irrational and arbitrary debasement of a vote violates
equal protection, “[e]ven without a suspect classification or invidious discrimination.”152 Nevertheless, with careful discovery,
plaintiffs may also be able to demonstrate intentional153 or
knowing discrimination,154 bolstering their equal protection violation claim.
148. League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 477–78
(6th Cir. 2008). To state a claim, a complaint must allege (1) deprivation of a
constitutional right, (2) by a person acting under color of the law. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2006); Jones v. Duncan, 840 F.2d 359, 361–62 (6th Cir. 1988).
149. League of Women Voters of Ohio, 548 F.3d at 468–69. Since party caucuses are technically independent from the state, uniform disability laws do
not apply. See PENIEL CRONIN, 2008 DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE
ELECTION: PRIMARY VERSUS CAUCUS 1 (2008), available at http://www.talkleft
.com/media/2008caucusreport.pdf; WANG, supra note 13, at 5 (discussing how
disability laws do not apply to or are not enforced at caucuses). This raises the
possibility of a fundamental right to access claim. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541
U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004) (holding that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act implicates a fundamental right of access enforceable by Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment).
150. League of Women Voters of Ohio, 548 F.3d at 476.
151. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1976).
152. Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889, 899 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
153. See, e.g., STEVEN SCHIER, BY INVITATION ONLY: THE RISE OF
EXCLUSIVE POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 31 (2000).
154. See, e.g., WANG, supra note 13, at 3 (discussing the debate among
Iowa election officials over who they would exclude based on when they sched-
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Litigants appear to be having some success in challenging
arbitrary election procedures on equal protection grounds. In
the caucus context, the inflexible all-or-nothing attendance rule
arbitrarily excludes voters, making it potentially fertile ground
for an equal protection dispute.
C. CAUCUSES MAY CONSTITUTE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL POLL
TAX
The caucus attendance requirement may also violate the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment because the associated financial
burden of voting in a caucus amounts to a poll tax. The attendance requirement effectively forces voters who would otherwise vote absentee in a primary to pay to participate in a caucus.155
In an attempt to define the amendment’s parameters, election-law scholar Allison Hayward proposed a rule to define “poll
or other tax.”156 For a tax or fee to be invalid under her rule, it
must be a mandatory cost directly tied to voting.157 Taxes or
fees owed irrespective of voting—such as costs paid for licenses
that drivers would obtain anyway or avoidable transportation
costs—would be constitutional under her proposed rule.158
Hayward argued that a poll tax claim may actually be stronger
than an equal protection claim because equal protection challenges to voting taxes largely depend on the “proclivities of
judges,” but it is harder for a judge to “reason away” a TwentyFourth Amendment standard.159 Thus, the latter could be a
more stable and powerful argument in applicable contexts.160
By contrast, other commentators argue that a poll or other tax
“should be read to include any monetized cost which directly or
indirectly imposes an additional cost on voters in their casting
of a vote such that it would discourage individuals from votuled the caucus); Krieger, supra note 1, at 1 (describing how the party knew
that holding the 2008 Nevada caucus on a Saturday would exclude Orthodox
Jews, but decided to do it anyway).
155. See Kantor, supra note 8, at A1 (describing one person who would
miss the caucus because he was an evening cook who could not leave work and
another who had to care for her autistic child). Homebound or disabled voters
may require unique, expensive transportation in order to attend their caucuses. See WANG, supra note 13, at 5.
156. See Hayward, supra note 90, at 118.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 119–20.
160. Id.
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ing.”161 They contend that their broader test better addresses
poll tax “substitutes” and Hayward’s test creates a selfdefeating loophole.162 They also suggest that one existing political practice that may fall within the scope of the amendment is
the caucus system.163
Employing either test, litigants may be able to persuade a
court that there are costs directly associated to caucuses that
would be absent in primaries or other forms of voting. Litigants
should emphasize the two most significant differences between
voting in primaries and caucuses: actual, physical attendance
and the narrow time period of caucuses. First, plaintiffs should
produce evidence of the added financial burden that physically
going to their caucus locations could cost them. Examples
might include transportation costs for a student attending college away from home or a person who must leave a child or an
aging parent with a paid caregiver. Second, voters should argue
that the narrow voting time frame of caucuses causes specific
hardship that would not be present in a primary situation, like
leaving work to attend a caucus. Although there is limited poll
tax case law, litigants have had some success with similar arguments in voter identification cases.164
Political caucuses impose direct and indirect burdens on
voters. Real cost data exist on the trade-offs caucus voters face
in casting their caucus ballots.165 By employing empirical data
on burdens produced by the mandatory attendance requirement, litigants may be able to establish that the caucus attendance requirement is an unconstitutional poll or other tax.
III. IMPROVING THE NOMINATIONS PROCESS:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
Although this Note has thus far focused on potential court
challenges to caucuses, it also speaks to legislatures and party
leaders, acknowledging that they may be more effective actors
to achieve uniform caucus reform. This Part presents four
reform proposals for eliminating or mitigating the burdens cau161. See Schultz & Clark, supra note 95, at 63 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 63–64.
163. See id. at 76.
164. See, e.g., Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 209–10 (Mo. 2006)
(overturning a state voter-identification statute after finding that the statute
placed a substantial burden on the fundamental right to vote and was not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest).
165. See CRONIN, supra note 149, at 1.
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cuses place on individual constitutional rights and briefly
summarizes the comparative advantages and disadvantages of
pursuing reform through various actors. It concludes that Congress is best suited to legislatively and uniformly reform caucuses.
A. REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS
The first proposal is to eliminate caucuses entirely. This
would produce the best outcome, as it would resolve the constitutional infirmities of caucuses.166 However, this may be politically infeasible. Several key actors hold competing interests
and the mode of implementation of reform is a critical consideration for maintaining a fair, workable balance. For example,
if courts were to intervene by replacing caucuses with primaries, such reform may come at the cost of party independence.
Elimination of caucuses may also violate the Burdick test,
which requires such burdensome intervention to be as narrowly
tailored as possible.167 It is unclear whether state interests in
caucus reform justify such significant judicial intervention.
Therefore, this Note presents several less intrusive alternatives
that a consensus of actors is more likely to support. Nevertheless, there is room in federal precedent for an argument that
the potential constitutional violations of caucuses this Note
presents necessitate their elimination.168
A second proposal is the addition of an absentee ballot option to caucuses. In 2004, the Maine Democratic Party instituted an absentee voting process for its precinct caucuses.169 In
2008, of its approximately 45,000 presidential preference ballots cast, 5000 were submitted absentee.170 Using Maine as a
model, parties could provide for an absentee ballot option that
would operate similarly to a primary election absentee ballot.
Since some caucus states have a minimum threshold rule,171

166. It is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss the merits of regional and
direct national primaries, but this analysis contends that either of these primary systems would better address the constitutional concerns presented by
the attendance requirement than caucuses in their present form.
167. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
168. See Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974) (upholding a
state’s regulation of party activity by instituting a caucus instead of a primary).
169. See Manning Interview, supra note 45.
170. Id.
171. Threshold rules require candidates to receive a minimum percentage
of the vote in order to earn delegates. Like instant run-off voting, a candidate
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voters could rank their presidential candidates in order of
preference in case their top choices were eliminated.172
This proposal illustrates a simple, voluntary process that
state or national parties could adopt. Although this proposal
does not entirely remedy associational rights or equal protection violations, it does mitigate them by expanding voter access
and increasing caucus legitimacy by making participation easier. Additionally, it would effectively eliminate the financial
burden placed upon individuals unable to participate, thereby
resolving the poll tax issue. Nonetheless, two practical concerns
impede adoption: funding and party control. The administrative costs of creating, mailing, and counting absentee ballots, as
well as optional efforts to publicize an absentee ballot option to
potential voters, are unappetizing to many party leaders and
may outweigh their genuine desires to improve the caucus
process.173 A second detractor to the absentee option is campaign control. Modern campaigns operate by microtargeting
and activating likely caucus-goers.174 Implementing an absentee process would require campaigns to predict which voters
will participate by absentee.175 Campaigns are often closely
connected to the political parties making caucus administration
decisions and these initial hassles may influence a party’s decision to create an absentee ballot option. Nonetheless, this alone
is not a sufficient reason to forgo efforts at caucus reform. Furthermore, this may give parties the satisfaction of crafting their
own plans for increasing caucus accessibility, rather than forcing parties to comply with an outside agent’s mandate.
A third reform proposal is to employ new technology to increase long-distance participation. One example is a supplemental Internet voting scheme. In 2004, the Michigan Democratic Party allowed caucus voters to either attend a traditional

without this number is eliminated and his or her supporters’ votes are redistributed to remaining candidates. See Mayer, supra note 11, at 111 tbl.4.1.
172. Id. At precinct caucuses, voters also select the party delegates who
will attend the next caucus level. Id. at 108. Since the delegates often announce their intention to run at the caucus, under this proposal voters unable
to attend the caucus would only vote for their presidential preference, not specific individual delegates. Id.
173. See Manning Interview, supra note 45.
174. See SCHIER, supra note 153, at 31.
175. See Telephone Interview with Mark Brewer, Chair, Mich. Democratic
Party (Nov. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Brewer Interview] (discussing the initial
negative reaction of some campaigns to the influx of new voters within the
context of Internet voting).
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caucus, vote by mail, or submit votes online.176 The party stated
that it implemented the online option to increase voter participation.177 The party employed “state-of-the-art” security and a
system to guard against double-voting,178 and allowed voters a
five-week voting window.179 A similar proposal is a virtual caucus.180 Voters would enter a forum administered by the party,
chat through instant messaging to form alliances, and vote.181
The virtual caucus would still have to satisfy the same legal
standards as a physical caucus, which means that votes must
be equal and cannot be diluted. A third possibility is a public
television access system. Voters could participate by watching
the caucus on television and then submitting their votes either
through the Internet or by telephone, using verification information unique to an individual voter.
An online or supplemental Internet voting scheme would
mitigate, but not resolve, the possible associational rights and
equal protection concerns. Like absentee ballots, it would give
voters more options and limit the party-initiated burden of the
attendance requirement. Nonetheless, the attendance requirement would still exclude some people. Perhaps the most significant flaw in using Internet technology is the disproportionate
lack of access to computers for certain segments of society, including lower economic classes, racial minorities, and people
lacking computer literacy.182 Additionally, Internet technology
does not necessarily eliminate the financial poll tax burden of
caucuses for people without Internet access. Recognizing this
problem, a member of the Democratic National Committee
challenged Michigan’s online voting proposal in 2004, but the
committee nonetheless approved it.183 In response, campaigns
tried to bridge the digital divide by bringing laptops to poten176. See Robert E. Pierre & Dan Keating, Online Voting Clicks in Michigan; Internet Ballots Part of Caucuses, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2004, at A12;
Brewer Interview, supra note 175.
177. Brewer Interview, supra note 175.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Priya Chatwani, Note, Retro Politics Back in Vogue: A Look at How
the Internet Can Modernize the Reemerging Caucus, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
313, 324 (2005).
181. Id. at 324 –31. As in an actual caucus, participants could choose to
vote uncommitted. Id.
182. See NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast Feb. 6, 2004),
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/jan-june04/michiganinternet_
02-06.html.
183. See Pierre & Keating, supra note 176, at A12.
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tial voters at their jobs, nursing homes, and schools.184 Nonetheless, those targeted efforts did not eliminate the greater
problem of disproportionate access.
A fourth and final reform proposal is to shift from caucuses
to a hybrid caucus-primary system, or spread the caucus over
two or more days. This proposal would not eliminate the attendance requirement but would widen the timeframe for participation. Some states have debated splitting caucuses into one
weekday and one weekend, of which voters would only have to
attend one.185 The Texas Democratic Party offers another model. It instituted a two-step process for selecting delegates, combining a daytime state-operated primary with a nighttime party caucus.186 The votes in the primary election account for twothirds of the total delegates selected for a candidate and the
caucus accounts for the remaining one-third.187 This system, or
a tweaked version of it, is a step closer to avoiding the more
significant constitutional burdens on associational and equal
protection rights associated with caucuses, but it does not eliminate them. Further, some litigants have challenged in court
the complexity of the Texas system.188 They have maintained
that the system is fundamentally unfair because it treats votes
disproportionately.189 With these concerns in mind, this Note
does not endorse a Texas-like system, but does recognize the
underlying efforts of such a system to address the fundamental
unfairness of the traditional caucus attendance requirement.
B. EVALUATING THE BEST ACTORS TO INITIATE CAUCUS
REFORM
Some nonjudicial actors have the authority—but perhaps
not the capacity—to reform the caucus system. This section examines the most likely actors and concludes that Congress is
the best nonjudicial entity to reform the nominations process.
Perhaps the most effective, legitimate source for regulating
caucuses is Congress. The Constitution gives Congress the
184. Id.; NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, supra note 182.
185. See David Yespen, Double the Fun: Split the Dates for Caucuses, DES
MOINES REG., Oct. 4, 2007, at A13, available at 2007 WLNR 27441192.
186. See Aileen B. Flores, Texas Demos Rethink ‘2-Step’ Primary Process,
EL PASO TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 22091567.
187. Id.
188. Elaine Ayala, Panel Hears LULAC Case over Texas ‘Two-Step’, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Aug. 13, 2009), http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/
53172737.html.
189. See id.
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power to regulate federal elections in at least two clauses. First,
the Presidential Election Clause grants Congress the power to
set the time and day for choosing presidential electors.190
Second, the Congressional Election Clause gives Congress the
power to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections for
U.S. senators and representatives.191 Additionally, Congress
has at least some power to affect elections under its military
authority.192 For example, Congress may be able to take some
actions to change the nominations process as applied to members of the military. Although no clause expressly grants Congress the power to regulate the nominations process, the Supreme Court has recognized broad congressional power to
regulate both general elections and primaries. In United States
v. Classic, for example, the Court held that the Congressional
Election Clause grants Congress authority to regulate primaries for congressional elections when they are “integral” to the
election process.193 Additionally, in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court
upheld Congress’s campaign finance regulation of presidential
elections, including primaries.194 In light of the proposed solutions, Congress is the most authoritative actor in this context
and could implement any of them as they relate to federal elections.195 However, empirically, congressional efforts to regulate
primary dates to avoid front-loading have been unsuccessful in
provoking national party action.196 Nonetheless, a congressional attempt to regulate primaries may at least galvanize parties
to act themselves.197 The issue of absentee ballots in caucuses
is already under consideration by both national parties,198 so
congressional pressure might be effective.
By contrast, state governments have the authority, but
probably not the capacity, to uniformly reform caucuses. Al190. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
191. Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
192. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
193. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941); see also Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 659–60 (1944) (recognizing Congress’s power to regulate primary elections).
194. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976).
195. Cf. Hasen, supra note 136, at 2016–19 (concluding, based on federal
case law, that Congress likely has authority to regulate the nominations
process).
196. Congress has debated, conducted hearings, and considered legislation
on various forms of regulation for decades. See, e.g., Regional Presidential
Primary and Caucus Act of 2007, S. Res. 1905, 110th Cong. (2007).
197. See Hasen, supra note 136, at 2009–10.
198. See Zeleny, supra note 46; Buhler Interview, supra note 46.
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though state governments may regulate the time, place, and
manner of federal elections, their authority is subject to Congress.199 Additionally, the Supreme Court has stated, “States
themselves have no constitutionally mandated role in the great
task of the selection of Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates.”200 In voting for federal officers, voters exercise a federal—not a state—right, although state constitutions may expand this right.201 Therefore, states may act, but only without
congressional objection. It is also noteworthy that states do not
have a colorable Tenth Amendment objection to the imposition
of greater regulation by Congress.202
State legislatures could probably institute most of the recommendations proposed by this Note. However, it is often in
the self-interests of state legislators to appease local and state
party leaders, as they are repeat players in the electoral system
and party leaders are likely to prefer the inflated influence they
have under a caucus system.203 Further, congressional action
would be preferable for purposes of national uniformity.
Caucus state political parties and party leaders are unlikely to support caucus reform because they generally benefit by
controlling nominations by caucus, especially in early states
like Iowa that receive national media attention.204 For example,
if Iowa surrendered its caucus, unless it secured an equally coveted first-in-the-nation primary date, its uniqueness would
likely fade, and so would the attention it gleans from candidates and national parties.
Finally, it seems natural that the national parties are the
fitting entities to reform the system. However, the parties may
not actually have the influence necessary to regulate state parties.205 This depends on the magnitude of reform national parties pursue. Until recent decades, national parties have gener199. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
200. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 489–90 (1975).
201. Id.
202. See, e.g., Leonard P. Stark, Note, The Presidential Primary and Caucus Schedule: A Role for Federal Regulation?, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 331,
377–78 (1996).
203. Joanna Klonsky, The Caucus System in the U.S. Presidential Nominating Process, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 3, 2008), http://www
.cfr.org/publication/15640/caucus_system_in_the_us_presidential_nominating_
process.html.
204. See Stark, supra note 202, at 359.
205. Cf. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 30–31 (illustrating failed attempts by national parties at systematic reform).
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ally left delegate selection details to state parties.206 Therefore,
it is unclear whether they could force procedural change on
state parties. In the context of primary frontloading, some
scholars argue that parties have demonstrably failed to control
state party action.207 For instance, the Democratic National
Committee established a time window for delegate selection,
but when state parties violated it in 1984, the National Democratic Party relented.208 In 2008, a similar controversy
emerged, with the Democratic National Committee threatening
to block Michigan and Florida delegations from the national
convention.209 The Party eventually seated the delegates.210
Based on this history, it is unclear that national parties would
be able to institute national compliance, even if they wanted to.
CONCLUSION
Caucuses have survived in the “backwater” of the nominations process.211 Despite public calls to modernize the
process, many caucus states still require participants to be
physically present to vote. This constraint raises grave constitutional concerns under the doctrines of First Amendment associational rights, Fourteenth Amendment equal protection,
and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of poll or other voting taxes. This Note suggests that litigants may be able
to challenge successfully the attendance requirement on one of
these constitutional grounds. Alternatively, Congress would be
the best agent to institute uniform presidential nomination
reform. National parties may be able to instigate reform but it
is unclear whether they have the influence necessary to uproot
the entrenched caucus tradition. However, this Note also proposes that various actors may be able to strike a compromise
through more subtle caucus reform like an absentee ballot option or Internet voting.
206. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 202, at 356–59.
207. See Emmett H. Buell, Jr., The Invisible Primary, in IN PURSUIT OF
THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 11, at 1, 7–11.
208. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 11, at 26–27; Buell, supra note 207.
209. See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Bill Nelson, Lawmakers Sue to Protect Right to Vote (Oct. 4, 2007), available at http://billnelson.senate.gov/news/
details.cfm?id=284931&.
210. See DNC’s Statement on the Florida and Michigan Delegations, WALL
ST. J. WASH. WIRE BLOG (May 31, 2009, 9:03 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
washwire/2008/05/31/dncs-statement-on-the-florida-and-michigan-delegations/.
211. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: 1789–
1996, at 142 (1997).

